Cultural Perspectives on Climate Change: Examining Differences among College Students in Climate Change Threat Perception, Knowledge, and Behaviors by Hecht, Hanna R.
International Social Science Review 
Volume 97 Issue 1 Article 4 
Cultural Perspectives on Climate Change: Examining Differences 
among College Students in Climate Change Threat Perception, 
Knowledge, and Behaviors 
Hanna R. Hecht 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr 
 Part of the Anthropology Commons, Communication Commons, Economics Commons, Geography 
Commons, International and Area Studies Commons, Political Science Commons, and the Public Affairs, 
Public Policy and Public Administration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hecht, Hanna R. () "Cultural Perspectives on Climate Change: Examining Differences among College 
Students in Climate Change Threat Perception, Knowledge, and Behaviors," International Social Science 
Review: Vol. 97 : Iss. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr/vol97/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in International Social Science Review by an authorized editor of Nighthawks Open 
Institutional Repository. 
Cultural Perspectives on Climate Change: Examining Differences among College 
Students in Climate Change Threat Perception, Knowledge, and Behaviors 
Cover Page Footnote 
Hanna R. Hecht received her BA, Communications and Sustainability, in 2020 from George Washington 
University. 
This article is available in International Social Science Review: https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr/vol97/
iss1/4 
           
 
Cultural Perspectives on Climate Change: 
Examining Differences among College Students in Climate Change Threat Perception, 
Knowledge, and Behaviors 
 
Climate change is one of the most pressing issues facing our planet. Over the past several 
decades—and especially in recent years—the world has seen this problem grow and has 
observed the devastating impacts that it has had on local communities and the global community 
at large: Weather patterns have shifted, threatening food supply and production; sea levels have 
risen, increasing the risk of catastrophic flooding; global average temperatures have climbed, 
jeopardizing public health and biodiversity.1 Thus, if local, state, and federal governments, as 
well as businesses, communities, and individuals continue with a “business as usual” approach to 
climate change, these calamitous effects will only worsen and broaden in scope of impact. 
According to the 2018 Special Report released by the International Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), the global average temperature will likely increase 1.5-2.0°C by 2030 if climate change 
remains unabated, exacerbating current climate-related risks and impacts for both human and 
natural systems.2  
To thoroughly address this pressing issue, one must be able to effectively communicate 
its severity to the public in a manner that will incite action and inspire change. However, given 
the multifaceted diversity of our global community, it is inevitable that public knowledge and 
attitudes regarding the climate crisis will vary among and within countries and their respective 
cultures. Therefore, it is very important to be able to gauge cultural perspectives on this issue to 
be able to more effectively tailor our climate change communication to meet these various 
baseline measures and overcome certain cultural differences that may serve as an advantage or 
disadvantage in engendering climate action. Furthermore, assessing the climate-related thoughts 
and opinions of younger generations—particularly college students—is vital to achieving 
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effective climate change communication, as today’s youth will comprise the next generation of 
thought leaders, policy makers, and catalysts.  
Literature Review 
 
Given its ubiquitous effects and increasing media attention, there is a growing and 
diverse body of research on climate change as it relates to the public’s awareness, understanding, 
and attitudes. This section reviews relevant research on climate change threat perception, 
knowledge, and behavior; greenhouse gas emissions; college students; cultural worldview; and 
the Cultural Theory of Risk. Throughout this paper, the term “climate change” rather than 
“global warming” will be used, except when referencing studies in which the latter is employed 
as a stimulus term. While these two terms are often used interchangeably, they are not 
synonymous, as “global warming” strictly refers to increases in temperature resulting from rising 
atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions.3 The more scientifically correct term, “climate change,” 
thus accounts for the more varied changes in the climactic system—such as alterations in 
precipitation distribution and intensity—in addition to rising temperatures, that result from 
increasing greenhouse gas emissions.4  
Climate Change Threat Perception, Knowledge, & Behavior 
Research on cross-national public threat perception, knowledge, and behavior regarding 
climate change dates back to the early 1990s, when the George H. Gallup International Institute 
conducted their “Health of the Planet” (HOP) survey, which was the largest environmental 
opinion survey to ever be administered at the time.5 The HOP study surveyed twenty-four 
nations of varying levels of economic development and political stability. Overall, results 
suggested a high level of concern for environmental issues among a majority of citizens in both 
industrialized and developing countries.6  
2
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This international survey laid the groundwork for three pioneering studies in the field of 
climate change communication. Two studies released in 1998 both found a universal awareness 
yet vague understanding of climate change among respondents in cross-national surveys on 
environmental attitudes.7
 
Findings from these studies also suggested limited perceived threat of 
climate change impacts, as respondents indicated greater concern for other environmental and 
social issues.8 However, these analyses and findings were largely skewed towards the Western 
world (i.e. the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Mexico, and Brazil). In 2003, Brechin 
obtained data from a more diverse sample of countries: While he found a slight increase in global 
understanding of climate change and its anthropogenic (i.e. man-made or human-induced) 
causes, he identified a consistent lack of knowledge regarding the overall problem.9 
Additionally, in concurrence with the two previous studies and the 1992 HOP Gallup poll, 
Brechin found no statistically significant difference in climate change knowledge between 
“developed” and “developing’ nations.”10  
Since these four foundational studies were published, research on global public attitudes 
regarding climate change has boomed and researchers have collected data from an increasing 
number of countries around the world. As a result, more recent studies have identified 
widespread patterns and long-term trends in the lay public’s climate change-related threat 
perception, knowledge, and behaviors, greatly improving our understanding of the issue.11  
“Threat perception” refers to one’s interpretation of risk and corresponding level of 
concern based on his or her beliefs or understanding of danger.12 These public threat perceptions 
are shaped by a wide variety of factors, including social and psychological variables, as well as 
technical and scientific definitions of danger.13 With regard to climate change, more recent 
studies have found wide discrepancies among countries in public threat perception and level of 
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concern for the issue: While climate change concern tends to be high among citizens in 
developing nations, the issue is perceived as a distant, non-personal threat by those in more 
developed countries.14 For instance, the 2009 Pew Global Attitudes Project surveyed twenty-five 
countries and found that, when asked if global warming is a “very serious problem,” 67 percent 
of respondents in India agreed with the statement as compared to only 44 percent of respondents 
in the United States and 30 percent of respondents in China.15 These findings clearly contradict 
past findings that have suggested a universally high level of concern and perceived threat of 
climate change, prompting the need for further research on the topic.16 
Trends in the global public’s climate change knowledge—which refers to the factually 
correct climate change-related information acquired and employed by an individual—have also 
been identified in recent studies. While past studies have reported consistent levels of climate 
change awareness and knowledge across the global population, more recent findings suggest the 
contrary. Similar to the aforementioned studies on threat perception, those that have examined 
climate change-related knowledge have also discovered large differences among developed and 
developing countries.17 For instance, when Lee et al. surveyed a representative sample of the 
world’s adult population from 199 countries, they found that approximately 40 percent of adults 
worldwide have never heard of climate change.18 Moreover, while over 90 percent of the public 
in developed regions, like North America, Europe, and Japan, were aware of climate change, 
more than 65 percent of adults in developing countries, such as Egypt, Bangladesh, and India, 
were generally unaware of the issue.19 This finding has been replicated and supported in other 
studies, such as Pugliese and Ray’s Gallup report, which identified that only about 61 percent of 
the world’s population knew “something” about global climate change.20 Therefore, while this 
body of research provides great insight into worldwide awareness and knowledge levels 
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regarding climate change, further research is, again, necessary to explore the conflicting findings 
that exist on the topic.  
“Climate change mitigation behavior” refers to any human intervention that aims to 
“reduce emissions or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases.”21 These behaviors span across all 
major economic sectors (e.g. food, agriculture and land management, and transportation) and 
include individual actions such as recycling; walking, biking, or using public transportation to 
commute rather than driving a car; and reducing consumption of single-use and disposable 
items.22 Despite the importance that these individual-level behaviors serve in allaying the 
impacts and consequences of climate change, little research exists on the topic. To date, most of 
the literature on climate change mitigation behavior focuses on the various personal and 
psychological factors that predict one’s likelihood of engaging in these pro-environmental 
behaviors.23 As such, many studies have specifically focused on the role that an individual’s 
climate change threat perception and knowledge play in influencing corresponding mitigation 
behaviors.24 While some studies have found that different types of climate change knowledge 
(e.g. casual, action-related, result-related, etc.) have varying effects on climate change threat 
perception and willingness to engage in mitigation behaviors, most findings support the general 
conclusion that higher levels of climate change knowledge and concern positively correlate with 
likelihood of pro-environmental behavior change.25  
Some researchers have also examined the way in which certain cognitive styles and 
habitual thought patterns can serve as barriers to individual and collective climate action.26 In 
one such study, O’Riordan and Stoll-Kleemann used Kahneman’s concepts of “fast” and “slow” 
thinking to explain why it is often more difficult for people to make sustainable dietary shifts 
(e.g. transitioning to a more plant-based diet) as compared to engaging in other pro-
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environmental behaviors (e.g. walking instead of driving).27 The authors note that people’s 
eating behaviors are often habitual and thus a product of “fast” thinking: Since these behaviors 
are “repetitive, routine, reliable, reinforcing, and rewarding,” they decrease cognitive burden and 
uncertainty and, in effect, enable people to bypass the “slow” thinking processes that would 
encourage them to deliberate issues of morality and social responsibility.28 Olsen elaborated on 
this research by proposing several cognitive biases that are employed by the “fast” thinking 
system and further impede pro-environmental behavior change, such as “short-term bias,” in 
which people display greater sensitivity towards short-term rather than long-term risk and are 
consequently reluctant to make short-term sacrifices.29  
While this research highlights the influence that personal and psychological factors like, 
climate change-related concern and cognitive processes, can have in shaping one’s likelihood of 
engaging in mitigation behavior, it still remains unclear how other cultural variables or 
influences, such as worldview, may play into this relationship.  
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Distribution & Contribution 
“Greenhouse gases” (GHGs) are gases in the Earth’s atmosphere that trap outgoing 
energy from the sun and use this energy to heat the Earth’s surface. This process is commonly 
referred to as the “greenhouse effect” and suggests the crucial role that these gases play in 
maintaining a habitable global average temperature. Over the past 150 years, human activity has 
caused a spike in atmospheric concentration levels of  GHGs, particularly carbon dioxide (76 
percent), methane (16 percent), nitrous oxide (6 percent), and fluorinated gases (2 percent), such 
as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).30 Globally, the most prominent sources of these anthropogenic 
GHG emissions are the burning of fossil fuels for electricity, heat production, and transportation; 
agriculture, forestry, and other land-use change; and industry.31 Given the heat-trapping 
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capability of these gases, this increase in GHG concentration has consequently led to a rise in 
global average temperatures, resulting in a domino effect of large and small-scale climatic shifts. 
This human-induced increase in atmospheric GHG concentrations is a contributing factor of 
climate change.  
Much of the research regarding rising GHG concentrations and climate change has 
focused on emissions contributions between and within economic sectors, as well as among 
countries and geographic regions. Many studies have particularly examined the differences 
among “developed” and “developing” nations in their GHG emission contributions, highlighting 
the shifts that have occurred since the turn of the century.32 For example, in assessing the share 
of developing countries in global CO2 emissions in the late 1900s, Ravindranath and Sathaye 
found that, despite the developing world accounting for 73 percent of the global population by 
2000, it was only responsible for 37 percent of the cumulative global CO2 emissions, which came 
primarily from fossil fuel combustion and land-use change.33 This finding has been strongly 
supported by several other studies that have demonstrated the developing world’s historically 
small GHG emission contribution prior to the twenty-first century.34 However, more recent 
research points to a shift in these patterns: While North America and Europe are still the largest 
GHG emitters, the greatest increases in cumulative global emissions growth is coming from the 
developing world as a result of advancing economic development among these countries.35 In 
fact, developing nations and the least developed economies accounted for 73 percent of the 
global GHG emissions growth in 2004.36  
This research is helpful in establishing a better understanding of the global distribution of 
greenhouse gases and patterns in emissions contributions; however, there has been limited 
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investigation into how these country and region-specific contribution patterns may relate to the 
respective public’s attitudes and perceptions of climate change.  
College Students’ Climate Change Attitudes 
At present, there is limited research on college students’ climate change-related threat 
perception, knowledge, or behaviors, as a vast majority of past studies have focused on 
measuring these variables among primary and secondary school students.37 The literature that 
does exist on this population still provides useful insight into university students’ conceptions 
and misconceptions regarding climate change. Among these studies, there is a consensus 
reporting a general pattern of confusion about the causes and consequences of climate change.38 
For example, in Bozdoğan’s meta-analysis of studies conducted in the education discipline on 
the topic of climate change, he found that over 50 percent of students at the university level held 
the misconception that “the increase in the temperature due to greenhouse effect / global 
warming [would] lead to skin cancer.”39 Additionally, Bozdoğan points out that many of the 
commonly held misconceptions observed in studies of primary and secondary school students 
were also found in those studying university-level students.40 This finding is concerning 
considering that today’s college students will soon be faced with making important climate 
change policy decisions and assume the responsibility of shaping the way in which our world 
addresses this pressing issue. Further research is therefore necessary to gain a better 
understanding of how these misconceptions relate to university students’ climate change 
concern, knowledge, and behaviors.  
Cultural Worldview & Climate Change Attitudes  
Cultural worldview refers to the “shared mental representations, values and general 
social, cultural and political attitudes held by a group of individuals.”41 People tend to cultivate 
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worldviews, or cultural identities, that are consistent with the values held by the people they are 
surrounded by or the groups they belong to.42 These worldviews, in effect, serve as “orienting 
positions” that guide one’s thoughts and actions in a myriad of social situations.43 As such, an 
individual’s stance on contemporary and controversial topics, like global climate change, 
becomes ingrained in his or her cultural identity and consequently plays a large role in framing 
threat perceptions, knowledge, and reactive behaviors.44  
A number of studies have examined the impact of both worldview and knowledge in 
shaping one’s climate change threat perception, resulting in mixed findings. While some 
researchers have found that the effects of worldview on threat perception are independent from 
climate change knowledge level, others have found a significant correlation between worldview 
and knowledge.45 For instance, in studying a representative sample of U.S. adults, Kahan et al. 
found that, while controlling for science knowledge and literacy, cultural worldview significantly 
affected individuals’ climate change concern.46 However, these findings were not replicated in 
Stevenson et al. 's study that examined the influence of cultural worldview and climate change 
knowledge on adolescents’ acceptance of anthropogenic climate change and risk perception.47 
More specifically, they found that adolescents holding individualistic worldviews and median to 
low climate change knowledge levels were less likely to accept anthropogenic climate change 
and its associated risk than similarly knowledgeable students holding communitarian 
worldviews.48 However, there was no statistically significant difference between students 
holding individualistic worldviews and those with communitarian worldviews at high climate 
change knowledge levels.49 Nonetheless, despite these varied findings, both of these studies, 
along with others, have found support for the claim that individualistic and hierarchical 
worldviews correspond with lower levels of climate change concern and threat perception.50 
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Therefore, while there is substantial research and scientific consensus on the correlation between 
worldview and climate change concern, it remains unclear to what extent pre-obtained 
knowledge may affect this relationship. Moreover, additional research is needed to explore how 
worldview may affect climate change knowledge levels, independent of threat perception.   
 There is also a limited yet growing body of research concerning cultural worldview as it 
relates to individuals’ climate change mitigation behaviors. Thus far, findings from these studies 
suggest that people holding individualistic and hierarchical worldviews are less likely to engage 
in behaviors directed towards mitigating the impacts of climate change than those holding 
egalitarian and communitarian worldviews.51 Shi et al.'s study has been widely cited within this 
particular body of climate change research.52 After surveying 1,065 adults in the German-
speaking region of Switzerland, the researchers concluded that both individualistic and 
hierarchical worldviews were negatively correlated with willingness to adopt climate change 
mitigation behaviors.53 Even more, they found that worldview directly influenced mitigation 
behavior, as compared to other studies that have suggested the presence of intervening variables, 
such as level of concern and climate-related.54 However, as noted by the authors, these findings 
may lack generalizability outside of the Swiss population, since the study was only conducted 
among that particular demographic. Nonetheless, this study has undoubtedly provided useful 
insight into the interrelationship between worldview and climate change mitigation behaviors. 
Further research is now necessary to determine whether these findings are generalizable to more 
diverse populations.    
Cultural Theory of Risk  
 Cultural Theory of Risk (CTR) proposes that individuals’ risk perceptions and 
interpretations are largely influenced by social learning and cultural adherence.55 In other words, 
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risk and threat perception are socially constructed. More specifically, the theory is based on 
Douglas’s grid-group typology: “Grid” refers to the degree of regulation and restriction that a 
society imposes on an individual’s behaviors through social prescriptions and proscriptions, 
while ‘group’ refers to an individual's level of identification with and involvement in particular 
bonded social units or groups.56 A “low” grid orientation therefore corresponds to an egalitarian 
social structure and approach to life, where all people are equal and deserving of equal rights and 
opportunities, and few to no restrictions are placed on individuals’ participation in social roles. In 
contrast, a “high” grid orientation correlates with a more hierarchical social structure dominated 
by stratified role differentiation and the maintenance of these “rank-based constraints.”57 A 
“low” group orientation is typical of an individualistic society, in which competition, autonomy, 
and self-reliance are prioritized. Conversely, a “high” group orientation indicates an inclination 
towards a more collectivist way of life, where values of solidarity, self-sacrifice, harmony, and a 
sense of duty are upheld.  
 Therefore, when these grid-group dimensions are placed on a two-axis system, ranging 
from low to high, four typologies result: egalitarian (high group, low grid), hierarchical (high 
group, high grid), individualistic (low group, low grid), and fatalistic (low group, high grid). 
These typologies represent four different kinds of social environments and, accordingly, four 
different worldviews. CTR postulates that individuals and cultural groups can typically be 
classified into one of these four categories: They will either be more group-oriented or 
individual-oriented and will similarly either believe in the necessity of social rules and 
regulations to control behavior or not.  
These differing preferences for how society should function consequently shape the way 
in which individuals in each of the four typologies identify and perceive risk. Through these 
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categorized differences, CTR is believed to “predict and explain what kind of people will 
perceive which potential hazards to be how dangerous.”58 However, based on the premise that 
culture and nature are synergistic, mutually constitutive systems, CTR underwent an important 
development in the mid-1980s: Four “myths of nature,” or socially constructed models of the 
environment, were mapped onto the original four worldviews, thus broadening the understanding 
of the relationship between culture and nature and establishing a more systematic means of 
predicting culturally-driven environmental risk perception.59  
Accordingly, CTR proposes the following threat perception and nature-orientation 
characterizations for each of the four worldviews: Archetypal individualists perceive extreme 
threat in anything that impedes their autonomy and agency. Additionally, they adhere to the 
“dominant social paradigm,” seeing nature as self-preserving and limitless, especially when 
being exploited in favor of technological and research advances.60 On the other hand, the 
archetypal hierarchist fears social deviance, disruption of the existing power structure, and 
defers to expert knowledge when in the face of potential risk.61 Like individualists, hierarchists 
also view nature as self-preserving, however, within strict limits, that—if crossed—can result in 
dire consequences.62 Following, quintessential egalitarians express greater concern over social 
injustices and power hierarchies. Unlike hierarchists, egalitarians are accepting of social 
deviance yet skeptical of expert knowledge.63 Moreover, they view nature as fragile and highly 
susceptible to human impacts.64 Lastly, fatalists are often socially disengaged and marginalized, 
as they feel “tied and regulated by social groups they do not belong to.”65 Therefore, these 
individuals are often indifferent to risk, assuming that they have little influence over neither their 
social setting nor the environment.66   
12
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At present, a majority of the research surrounding CTR has focused on the 
aforementioned dimension of environmental risk perception, such as how people differ in their 
perceived threat of nuclear power generation or deforestation impacts, and a few studies have 
even focused more specifically on climate change.67 These studies have employed various 
“short-form” versions of Kahan’s original cultural cognition index, which measures cultural 
worldview with two continuous scales—one assessing an individual’s degree of “hierarchy-
egalitarianism” and the other assessing that of “individualism-communitarianism,” excluding 
fatalism.68 With regard to the body of research that has examined climate change perceptions in 
light of CTR, findings suggest that people who score higher on both the individualistic and 
hierarchical dimensions tend to be skeptical of environmental risks, as compared to those scoring 
higher on the egalitarian and communitarian dimensions, who generally acknowledge that 
climate change is largely caused by humans.69 Additionally, while the high individualistic-
hierarchical individuals believe that there is uncertainty and dissention among scientists 
regarding the existence of climate change, high egalitarian-communitarian individuals feel that 
there is a scientific consensus that climate change is happening.70 These findings therefore 
exemplify how Douglas and Wildavksy’s Cultural Theory of Risk can be applied to investigate 
climate change threat perception and subsequently provide foundational insight into why 
particular people or groups hold certain attitudes towards the issue. However, further research is 
now necessary to strengthen the empirical support for CTR. 
Present Study  
The present study aims to build upon this research and fill the aforementioned gaps by 
examining the association between cultural worldview and college students’ climate change 
threat perceptions, knowledge levels, and mitigation behaviors. Additionally, this study will 
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investigate the possibility of a relationship between the GHG emissions level of a college 
student’s home country and his or her climate change threat perception. Accordingly, the present 
study proposes the following research questions:  
➢ RQ1: Does perceived threat of climate change vary between college students holding 
different cultural worldviews?  
➢  RQ2: Does climate change knowledge vary between college students holding different 
cultural worldviews?  
➢ RQ3: Is there a relationship between a college student’s cultural worldview and his/her 
likelihood of engaging in climate change mitigation behaviors? 
➢ RQ4: Do college students from countries with low greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
perceive climate change as more or less of a threat than those from countries with 
relatively higher GHG emissions?  
Methods 
 In order to efficiently obtain the diverse and large sampling of participants necessary to 
properly address the aforementioned research questions, survey methodology was employed in 
this study. More specifically, a web-based survey was used to further aid in obtaining access to a 
large number of diverse respondents within a short timeframe and enable these individuals to 
anonymously record their responses. The following sections will detail information regarding the 
participants, procedures, and measures used in the present study.  
Participants  
 A total of 191 individuals responded to the survey. Nine of the original 191 respondents 
indicated non-student status and were immediately redirected to exit the survey. Additionally, 
thirty respondents did not complete the survey, and so their data was omitted from analysis. The 
remaining sample (n = 152) was 42.1 percent male (n = 64), 52.7 percent female (n = 87), and 
one participant identified as “other.” Regarding classification in college/university, a majority of 
respondents identified as “Senior” (35.5 percent, n = 54), followed by “Graduate student” (29.6 
percent, n = 45), “Junior” (16.4 percent, n = 25), “Sophomore” (13.2 percent, n = 20), and lastly 
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“Freshman/First-year” (5.3 percent, n = 8). Among the seven educational discipline categories 
provided, most participants indicated that their major, or anticipated major, fell within the 
“Literature, Language, & Social Science” field (29.6 percent, n = 45) or the “Engineering & 
Technology” field (22.4 percent, n = 34). Fewer participants selected the “Business” (12.5 
percent, n = 19), “Science & Math” (11.2 percent, n = 17), “Arts” (9.9 percent, n = 15), “Other” 
(6.6 percent, n = 10), and “Environment” (5.9 percent, n = 9) fields, respectively. Three 
respondents did not specify a field of study. Furthermore, of the sample, 54.6 percent (n = 83) 
identified their political views as “Liberal,” with 19.7 percent (n = 30) identifying as 
“Conservative” and 21.1 percent (n = 32) as “Moderate.” Seven respondents selected “Other” 
and identified the following political ideologies through text entry: “Leftist,” “Socialist,” 
“Progressive,” “Radical,” “Spiral Dynamics yellow stage perspective,” and “Independent.” In 
terms of the primary region in which respondents grew up, the modal response was North 
America (59.9 percent, n = 91), followed by Asia (24.3 percent, n = 37), South America (5.3 
percent, n = 8), and the European Union (4.6 percent, n = 7). Of the remaining participants, four 
(2.6 percent) selected “Central America,” three (2.0 percent) indicated the “Middle East,” and 
“Africa” and “Eastern Europe” were each chosen by one participant. Similarly, a majority of 
respondents reported that their home country was either the United States (68.4 percent, n = 
104), India (18.4 percent, n = 28), or Brazil (2.6 percent, n = 4). Each of the following countries 
was chosen by one respondent: Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, Finland, France, South 
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Procedure 
The present study used an anonymous web-based questionnaire constructed through 
Qualtrics, an online research and business insights platform. Since the study involved the use of 
survey procedures through which the subjects could not be identified, either directly or 
indirectly, through identifiers linked to the individuals, and any disclosure of the subjects’ 
responses outside of the study would not cause damage to the subjects in any way, the present 
study was exempted from the George Washington University’s IRB review. The survey was 
conducted over a fourteen-day span, from January 6, 2020 through January 19, 2020. 
Participants were recruited via nonprobability sampling methods, namely 
availability/convenience sampling, as the survey was distributed through public posts in 
university-affiliated Facebook pages, class email lists, and SMS group chats. These participants 
were not compensated. Additionally, forty participants were recruited through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, an Amazon Web Services crowdsourcing platform, and compensated $0.50 for 
completing the survey.71 Interested participants accessed the survey through an anonymous link 
provided by Qualtrics. Upon clicking on the survey link, all participants were presented with an 
informed consent form. They were provided the option to print the form for future reference and 
then clicked “next” to indicate consent and proceed to the rest of the survey. In order to ensure 
that all respondents were university students, participants were first asked to specify their 
“classification in college/university,” ranging from freshman/first year student to graduate 
student. Those who selected the option, “I’m not a student,” were redirected to the end-of-survey 
page. All remaining participants were then guided through a series of fifteen closed-ended and 
demographic questions detailed in the next section and subsequently thanked for their 
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participation upon completion of the survey. The order of items was the same for all participants 
and the survey took approximately ten minutes to complete.  
Measures 
 After obtaining informed consent and ensuring that participants were of student status, 
the survey prompted respondents with two demographic questions, one asking for the 
respondent’s gender and the other concerning the respondent’s field of study or anticipated field 
of study. Participants then proceeded to complete several measures used to assess the present 
study’s research questions. See Appendix A for all survey measures. Additionally, the final 
survey question asked respondents to identify whether their political views tended to lean liberal, 
conservative, or moderate. Respondents were also given the option to select “other” and write in 
a more applicable self-descriptor. This demographic question was reserved for the end of the 
survey in order to avoid priming responses based on political affiliations and their stereotypically 
associated social views.  
 Due to time constraints, an extensive pretest was not conducted in preparing for the 
present study. Therefore, to ensure measurement reliability and validity, several questions and 
indexes were adapted from previously published and widely tested surveys measuring the same 
concepts. Slight modifications were made to a few of the measures to ensure their contemporary 
relevance to the present study, such as updating predicted reference years for climate change 
impacts and including more recently popularized and demographically relevant climate change 
mitigation behaviors (e.g. reducing the use of single-use plastics and adopting a more plant-rich 
diet). Additionally, the present study’s final questionnaire received external feedback and 
approval from peers within the target demographic and an expert researcher.  
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Climate change threat perception  
Respondents completed four successive measures that assessed the degree to which they 
perceive climate change as a threat. The first question, adapted from Howe et al., provided 
respondents with a definition of “climate change” then asked them to indicate their level of 
concern regarding the general topic on a five-point labeled unipolar scale (M = 3.97, SD = 0.99). 
Response options ranged from “Not concerned at all” (coded 1) to “Extremely concerned” 
(coded 5).72 
 The second measure evaluated respondents’ level of concern about experiencing personal 
harm from global climate change during their lifetimes using a question from Stokes et al.73 
Again, respondents indicated their level of concern on a five-point labeled unipolar scale ranging 
from “Not concerned at all” (coded 1) to “Extremely concerned” (coded 5) (M = 3.74, SD = 
1.08).   
 The following two questions were based on Leiserowitz’s Risk Perception index, with 
wording modified for the context of the present study.74 The first of the two measures was a six-
item scale that addressed some of the possible effects of climate change. More specifically, the 
index measured respondents’ belief in the likelihood of climate change causing decreased 
standards of living, water shortages, and increased rates of infectious disease over the next thirty 
years, both worldwide and in their personal lives. For example, participants were asked, “How 
likely do you think it is that… Increased rates of serious disease will occur worldwide?” 
Participants recorded their responses on a seven-point bipolar Likert scale, with response options 
ranging from “Extremely unlikely” (coded 1) to “Extremely likely” (coded 7) (M = 5.41, SD = 
1.07). The six items were condensed into a single composite measure, which was internally 
consistent (α = 0.88). The second question measured the degree to which respondents perceived 
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climate change to be a serious threat to non-human nature (i.e., wildlife and “wild space” away 
from human populations) and provided five unipolar Likert-type response options ranging from 
“Not serious at all” (coded 1) to “Extremely serious” (coded 5) (M = 4.28, SD = 1.07).   
Climate change knowledge  
Respondents’ climate change knowledge was operationalized using a scale (α = 0.69) 
compiled from Tobler et al.’s causal and result-related knowledge indexes.75 Ten items from the 
original indexes were used and, again, wording was modified to better fit the context of the 
present study. The final knowledge scale consisted of both true (five items) and false (five items) 
statements that addressed a wide range of climate change-related knowledge, such as “The last 
century's global increase in temperature was the largest it's been in the past 1,000 years,” 
(correct) and “Over the next few decades, the climate will change evenly all over the world,” 
(incorrect). Respondents answered each item with “true” (coded 1), “false” (coded 0), or “don't 
know” (coded 0). The latter response option was included to discourage respondents from 
guessing.  
Climate change mitigation behaviors  
Respondents’ willingness to engage in climate change mitigation behaviors was 
measured using a modified six-item scale (α = 0.74) from Shi et al.76 Three items were taken 
directly from the original scale and three items were new to account for more contemporarily and 
demographically relevant climate change mitigation behaviors.  Participants were asked to select 
the statement that best described them with regard to their willingness to adopt each of the six 
climate change mitigation behaviors. Response options were presented on a five-point Likert 
scale ranging from “I am not willing to do this at all” (coded 1) to “I am already doing this” 
(coded 5). The scale included a wide range of activities commonly associated with mitigating 
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climate change, such as “Reducing consumption of disposable or single-use items (e.g. plastic 
bags, paper towels, packaged foods, etc.)” and “Walking, cycling, or taking public transportation 
instead of driving cars.”  
Cultural worldview  
Cultural worldview was measured using Kahan et al.'s twelve-item version of Kahan’s 
original cultural cognition index.77 The scale consisted of two successive subscales, one 
measuring hierarchy-egalitarianism (six items) and the other measuring individualism-
communitarianism (six items). The hierarchy-egalitarianism subscale (α = 0.83) contained six 
statements that reflected attitudes towards social stratification and social equality (e.g., “Our 
society would be better off if the distribution of wealth was more equal”). Similarly, the 
individualism-communitarianism subscale (α = 0.67) contained six statements that reflected 
attitudes towards the role of government regulation in societal functioning (e.g., “Sometimes the 
government needs to make laws that keep people from hurting themselves”). Respondents were 
asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with each of the twelve items on a 
seven-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” (coded 1) to “Strongly agree” (coded 
7) (Individualism scale: M = 3.47, SD = 1.05; Hierarchy scale: M = 2.49, SD = 1.35).   
Low versus high GHG countries  
In order to obtain the data necessary to answer the present study’s fourth research 
question regarding the correlation between a country’s GHG emissions level and an individual’s 
climate change threat perception, respondents were prompted with two more demographic 
questions. The first question asked participants to select the region that they primarily grew up in 
(North America, Africa, Eastern Europe, etc.), and the second question prompted participants to 
identify their home country. This information was then compared to 2018 data obtained by the 
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Global Carbon Project, specifying the historical and most recent GHG emissions level of each 
country and global region.78   
Results 
 All four research questions were assessed using SPSS data analysis software (v. 25). As 
previously mentioned, thirty of the original 191 respondents did not complete the survey or left 
missing items, and so their data was entirely omitted from analysis. Accordingly, preliminary 
analyses were run for each variable (climate change threat perception, knowledge, mitigation 
behavior, and cultural worldview) in which certain answers were reverse-coded and measures of 
inter-item reliability and central tendency were obtained. Separate Pearson’s correlation tests 
were then run to answer the first three research questions and an independent samples t-test was 
run for the fourth research question. The following sections detail the findings for each of the 
four questions.  
Cultural Worldview & Climate Change Threat Perception (RQ1) 
 RQ1 questioned whether climate change threat perception would vary among college 
students holding different cultural worldviews. Before any inferential analyses were conducted, 
the four measures used to assess respondents’ climate change threat perception were condensed 
into a single variable (α = 0.74). Descriptive statistics on this variable indicated a relatively high 
level of perceived threat among respondents (M = 4.35, SD = 0.79). Additionally, certain 
answers from the worldview scales were reverse coded (Individualism items 2, 5, 6; Hierarchy 
items 2, 3, 4) such that higher average scores on the individualism-communitarianism scale 
correlated with a higher degree of individualism and higher scores on the hierarchy-
egalitarianism scale corresponded with a higher degree of hierarchy. These reverse-coded scales 
were also used in the primary analyses for research questions two and three. On average, 
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respondents appeared to hold moderate individualistic and hierarchical worldviews, as responses 
on the two worldview subscales were normally distributed (Individualism scale: M = 3.49, SD = 
1.05; Hierarchy scale: M = 2.49, SD = 1.35).  
To examine the relationship between threat perception and worldview, two subsequent 
Pearson’s correlation tests were conducted: One between respondents’ average scores on 
perceived threat of climate change and individualism-communitarianism, and another between 
respondents’ average scores on perceived threat of climate change and hierarchy-egalitarianism. 
The first test found a significant yet weak negative relationship between climate change threat 
perception and individualism (r(152) = -0.279, p = 0.001), meaning that as individualistic 
worldview increased, level of perceived threat of climate change decreased. The second test 
revealed a statistically significant and moderate negative relationship between climate change 
threat perception and hierarchy (r(152) = -0.542; p < 0.001), meaning that as hierarchical 
worldview increased, the level of perceived threat of climate change decreased.    
Cultural Worldview & Climate Change Knowledge (RQ2) 
 RQ2 inquired whether climate change knowledge levels would vary among college 
students holding different cultural worldviews. Prior to conducting the primary analyses, 
respondents’ answers for knowledge items with incorrect statements (items 1, 2, 4, 6, and 9) 
were reverse coded. “Don’t know” responses were also recoded as wrong answers to produce 
binary data. Thus, 1 = “Correct” and 0 = “Incorrect” / “Don’t know.” Additionally, the last 
knowledge item (“If today's greenhouse gas content in the atmosphere stabilized, the climate 
would still warm for at least another 100 years.”) was removed from the scale during analysis 
after conducting a preliminary test for inter-item reliability and finding a low correct response 
rate (M = 0.51, SD = 0.50). The item was therefore deleted to produce a corrected, yet still poor, 
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inter-item reliability score of 0.691. Descriptive statistics from the remaining items in the 
knowledge scale indicated that respondents were fairly well informed about climate change (M = 
0.77, SD = 0.22). Correct response rates were highest for item three, “The increase of greenhouse 
gases is mainly caused by human activities” (M = 0.82, SD = 0.38), and lowest for item four, “A 
warmer climate will increase water evaporation, which will lead to an overall decrease of the sea 
level” (M = 0.63, SD = 0.49). See Table 1 for means and standard deviations of all knowledge 
items. As with the first research question, two Pearson’s correlation tests were run to examine 
the relationship between knowledge and individualism and between that of knowledge and 
hierarchy. Test results indicated a significant and weak negative relationship between knowledge 
and individualism (r(152) = -0.367, p < 0.001) and a significant and strong negative relationship 
between knowledge and hierarchy (r(152) = -0.754, p < 0.001), meaning that as each of these 
worldview dimensions increased, climate change knowledge decreased.  
Table 1 
 
Items used to assess respondents’ (n = 152) climate change-related 







1. “In past centuries, the average spatial extent of 
the snow blanket in the northern hemisphere 
remained unchanged.” * 
0.78 0.41 
2. “Over the next few decades, the climate is 
expected to drastically cool down.” * 
 
0.80 0.40 
3. “The increase of greenhouse gases is mainly 
caused by human activities.” 
 
0.82 0.49 
4. “A warmer climate will increase water 
evaporation, which will lead to an overall decrease 
of the sea level.” * 
 
0.63 0.40 
5. “Over the next few decades, there will be an 
increase in extreme events, such as droughts, 
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6. “Climate change is mainly caused by natural 
variations (such as changes in solar radiation 
intensity and volcanic eruptions).” * 
 
0.81 0.38 
7. “A warmer climate will likely increase the 
melting of polar ice, which will lead to an overall 
rise of the sea level.” 
 
0.79 0.40 
8. “The last century’s global increase in temperature 
was the largest it’s been in the past 1,000 years.” 
 
0.72 0.41 
9. “Over the next few decades, the climate will 




Note. * item was reverse coded. Respondents were provided response 
options of “True,” “False,” and “Don’t know” for each item. The means and 
standard deviations in this table represent the correct response rate for each 
item (correct = 1; incorrect/don’t know = 0).  
 
Cultural Worldview & Climate Change Mitigation Behavior (RQ3) 
 RQ3 questioned whether a college student’s cultural worldview was associated with his or 
her likelihood of engaging in climate change mitigation behaviors. Descriptive statistics on 
respondents’ behavior scale responses suggested a moderate to high willingness to engage in 
mitigation behaviors (M = 3.95, SD = 0.67). Respondents were most willing to engage in 
behavior item one, “Walking, cycling, or taking public transportation instead of driving cars” (M 
= 4.07, SD = 1.07), and behavior item six, “Reducing consumption of disposable or single-use 
items (plastic bags, paper towels, packaged foods, etc.)” (M = 4.07, SD = 1.07). Conversely, they 
were least willing to engage in behavior item two, “Adopting a more plant-rich diet by eating 
more plant-based foods and fewer animal proteins and products (e.g. meat, dairy, eggs)” (M = 
3.77, SD = 1.23). See Table 2 for means and standard deviations of all behavior items. Similar to 
the analyses conducted for RQ1 and RQ2, two Pearson’s correlation tests were conducted to 
examine this relationship between cultural worldview and climate change mitigation behavior. 
The first test suggested a significant and weak negative relationship between individualism and 
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the likelihood of engaging in climate change mitigation behaviors (r(152) = -0.388; p < 0.001), 
meaning that as individualism increased, the likelihood of engaging in these behaviors decreased. 
Likewise, the second test revealed a moderate negative relationship between hierarchy and 
mitigation behavior (r(152) = -0.438; p < 0.001), meaning that as hierarchy increased, the 
likelihood of engaging in mitigation behaviors decreased. Both tests indicated statistically 
significant correlations.  
Table 2 
Results of 152 respondents’ willingness to engage in behaviors to mitigate 







1. “Walking, cycling, or taking public transportation 
instead of driving cars.” 
4.07 1.07 
2. Adopting a more plant-rich diet by eating more 
plant-based foods and fewer animal proteins and 
products (e.g., meat, dairy, eggs).” 
 
3.77 1.23 
3. “Consuming seasonal food whenever possible.” 
 
3.93 0.88 
4. “Removing or switching off the power supply 
plug of electronic devices when these are not in use 




5. “Minimizing food waste by only buying 
necessary items and composting any food scraps.” 
 
3.89 0.99 
6. “Reducing consumption of disposable or single-





Note. Items were asked on a scale of 1-5 (“I am not willing to do this at all,” to “I 
am already doing this”). 
 
Countries’ GHG Emissions Levels & Climate Change Threat Perception (RQ4) 
 RQ4 questioned whether college students from countries with low greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions would perceive climate change as more or less of a threat than those from countries 
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with relatively higher GHG emissions. Due to the overwhelming majority of respondents who 
indicated that their home country was either the United States (68.4 percent, n = 104) or India 
(18.4 percent, n = 28), this research question could not be answered on a global scale. However, 
an independent samples t-test was still conducted to compare the average level of climate change 
threat perception between respondents who selected the United States (Total CO2 emissions = 
5.4 Gt) as their home country and those who chose India (Total CO2 emissions = 2.7 Gt).
79 
Results from the test revealed a statistically insignificant difference between the two groups’ 
climate change threat perception (t(130) = -1.69, p = 0.093).  
Discussion 
 The aim of the present study was to investigate the relationship between college students’ 
 cultural worldviews and their climate change-related threat perception, knowledge, and 
mitigation behaviors. In general, the findings from this study provided evidence of a relationship 
between these variables. More specifically, both individualism and hierarchy were associated 
with lower perceived threat of climate change, lower climate change knowledge levels, and 
lower willingness to engage in climate change mitigation behaviors. Additionally, while the 
study attempted to examine how college students’ climate change threat perceptions vary as a 
function of their home country’s GHG emissions level, no significant difference was found. 
Nonetheless, despite some limitations, the results of the present study suggest a number of 
implications for improving cross-cultural climate change communication among college 
students.  
Cultural Worldview & Climate Change Threat Perception 
 Through RQ1, the present study sought to understand the relationship between cultural 
worldview and college students’ climate change threat perceptions. Results to this research 
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question indicated that both individualistic and hierarchical worldviews corresponded with lower 
levels of perceived threat of climate change among college students. This finding is consistent 
with the broader body of knowledge on the influence of cultural worldview on threat perception. 
A majority of previous studies on this topic have also found a negative relationship between both 
individualist and hierarchical values and climate change concern.80 Likewise, these studies have 
provided evidence of a positive correlation between individualism and climate change 
skepticism, as well as a negative correlation between egalitarianism and climate change 
skepticism.81 This particular finding is also congruous with CTR’s threat perception and nature-
orientation characterizations of the four worldviews, which suggest that both individualists and 
hierarchists view nature as “self-preserving,” to a certain extent, and thus do not perceive 
extreme threat in environment-related issues. The results of RQ1 therefore contribute to the 
growing body of research on climate change threat perception in the context of cultural 
worldview, suggesting that patterns observed within other populations are also present among 
university students. Furthermore, this finding suggests that special attention should be paid to 
communicating the severity of the climate crisis particularly to college students holding both 
individualistic and hierarchical worldviews, as these groups may be less likely to recognize the 
broad and detrimental scope of its impacts. For instance, college students holding more 
hierarchical worldviews could possibly benefit from the presence of an authoritative figure (e.g. 
a dean or professor) who effectively communicates the severity of the climate crisis, as 
hierarchists typically defer to expert knowledge in the face of risk.  
 Findings for RQ1 also indicated that the average perceived threat of climate change 
among college students was relatively high. However, it is interesting to note that the majority 
(68.4 percent) of respondents reported their home country as the United States, which is 
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considered to be one of the top seven developed economies in the world.82 While this result is 
consistent with Dunlap et al. ’s HOP survey findings of a universally high level of perceived 
threat among all countries, it contradicts the more recent body of research on this topic.83 These 
studies have found evidence of a low level of climate change threat perception among people 
living in developed nations as compared to those living in developing countries.84 One possible 
explanation for the discrepancy in these findings is that the second most frequent home country 
chosen by participants was India (18.4 percent) which, according to the United Nations, is 
classified as a developing nation.85 In prior studies on climate change threat perception, 
participants in India have indicated a much higher level of concern than those in the United 
States.86 This difference in climate change threat perception may have therefore skewed the 
results of the present study. Additionally, this disparate finding may simply result from a lack of 
focus on college students within the existing literature on climate change threat perception, thus 
masking different threat perception patterns among college students as compared to the broader 
population. Nonetheless, this finding suggests that college students’ climate change threat 
perceptions may function independently from the economic development status of their home 
countries. Even more, this high level of perceived threat implies that climate change advocates 
may be able to invest more time and energy into inspiring climate-related action among college 
students rather than trying to raise awareness of the issue itself.  
Cultural Worldview & Climate Change Knowledge 
 The purpose of RQ2 was to investigate the relationship between college students’ cultural 
worldviews and their climate change-related knowledge. Findings from this research question 
revealed that both individualistic and hierarchical worldviews were associated with lower levels 
of knowledge regarding climate change. Additionally, the surveyed college students generally 
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appeared to be well informed on the issue. To date, prior research on this topic has only studied 
climate change-related knowledge as an intervening variable in the association between cultural 
worldview and climate change threat perception. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, the 
present study is therefore the first to examine the direct relationship between cultural worldview 
and climate change-related knowledge, providing evidence that an association may exist between 
the two variables. This finding thus suggests that lack of accurate knowledge regarding climate 
change may be a cultural barrier that must be overcome in order to achieve effective climate 
change communication with individualistic and hierarchically-minded college students.  
 With regard to the relatively high level of climate change knowledge observed among the 
study’s sample—of which a majority reported coming from developed nations—this finding is 
consistent with the existing literature on global knowledge trends. These studies have found that 
adults from developed nations are more aware of and knowledgeable about climate change than 
those from developing nations.87 These parallel findings therefore indicate that a similar pattern 
in climate change knowledge may exist among the world's college student population as in the 
global adult population.  
Looking more closely at respondents’ average correct response rates on individual 
knowledge items, results are also partly congruous with prior findings that college students tend 
to be less knowledgeable about the causes and consequences of climate change.88 The two lowest 
correct response scores were on knowledge items that measured causal knowledge (“the last 
century’s global increase in temperature was the largest it’s been in the past 1,000 years”) and 
result-related knowledge (“a warmer climate will increase water evaporation, which will lead to 
an overall decrease of the sea level”). However, the highest correct response score was also on an 
item measuring causal knowledge (“the increase of greenhouse gases is mainly caused by human 
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activities”). It is interesting to note, though, that the former causal knowledge item, the item with 
the lower scores, seems to measure a greater level of scientific understanding, as compared to the 
latter causal knowledge item, which assesses a more basic understanding of the anthropogenic 
nature of climate change. These results therefore suggest that, while college students may be 
generally knowledgeable about the issue of climate change, they may not possess a strong 
scientific understanding of its causes. Thus, efforts at improving climate change communication 
within this population could focus on providing students with more scientifically-based 
information.  
Cultural Worldview & Climate Change Mitigation Behaviors 
 Through RQ3, this study explored the relationship between college students’ cultural 
worldviews and their engagement in climate change mitigation behaviors. Findings from this 
research question demonstrated a negative association between both individualism and hierarchy 
and likelihood of engaging in mitigation behaviors. These results are consistent with the current 
body of research on this topic, as a majority of previous studies have also found that people 
holding more individualistic and hierarchical worldviews are less likely to engage in climate-
friendly behaviors as compared to individuals holding more communitarian or egalitarian 
worldviews.89 As Xue et al. suggest, it is possible that the low climate change threat perception 
observed among individualists and hierarchists mediates this relationship between worldview 
and mitigation behavior: Decreased environmental risk perception may undermine a desire to 
shift behaviors and support climate friendly policies, as these actions would likely be perceived 
to threaten individual freedoms and disrupt existing power structures.90 However, the present 
study did not test for potential intervening variables, thus no conclusions can be drawn regarding 
a direct association between worldview and mitigation behaviors. Nonetheless, this finding still 
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suggests that certain subgroups of college students holding individualistic and hierarchical 
worldviews may benefit from more intensive behavioral interventions in order to facilitate 
change towards a more climate-friendly lifestyle.  
 While respondents appeared willing to engage in climate change mitigation behaviors in 
general, their willingness varied among the individual items in the behavior scale.   
Results revealed that scores were highest for items involving low short-term sacrifice, such as 
behavior item one (“walking, cycling, or taking public transportation instead of driving cars”) 
and behavior item four (“removing or switching off the power supply plug of electronic devices 
when these are not in use”) Conversely, scores were lowest for behavior items referring to shifts 
in dietary or food consumption patterns, such as item two, “adopting a more plant-rich diet by 
eating more plant-based foods and fewer animal proteins and products.” These findings are 
consistent with previous studies that have examined barriers to personal behavior change. In their 
research, O’Riordan and Stoll-Kleemann suggest that people’s eating patterns are largely driven 
by “fast” thinking, habit, and “ingrained outlooks,” making it more difficult to shift these 
behaviors as compared to others.91 Additionally, it is possible that cognitive biases, such as the 
“short-term bias,” may have contributed to participants’ decreased willingness to make pro-
environmental changes in their dietary patterns, as these changes could be perceived to be too 
risky in the short-term. Taken together, these results therefore suggest that, while college 
students seem generally willing to engage in climate change mitigation behavior, additional or 
more intensive intervention may be necessary to encourage changes in certain behaviors, such as 
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Countries’ GHG Emissions Levels & Climate Change Threat Perception 
The purpose of RQ4 was to examine the relationship between the GHG emissions level of 
a college student’s home country and his or her climate change threat perception. While a 
demographically skewed sample prevented a global analysis of this research question, results 
from an independent samples t-test between respondents from the United States and India 
revealed an insignificant difference in climate change threat perception. Previous literature on 
the topic of global GHG emissions has found that, although developing nations, such as India, 
have accounted for the largest contributions to worldwide emissions growth in recent years, 
developed countries—same as the United States—are still the largest emitters. However, this 
finding suggests that these differences in GHG emissions levels among college students’ home 
countries may not affect whether they perceive climate change as more or less of a threat. It is 
important to note, however, that both the United States and India are ranked among the top five 
CO2 emitters in the world. Therefore, while the United States has a higher emissions level than 
India, the relatively small difference between the two nations, as compared to other countries 
with much smaller emissions contributions, may account for this insignificant finding. It is also 
possible that this finding results from a spurious relationship between the two variables, as the 
present study did not test for the influence of any potential intervening variables, such a religion, 
climate change media coverage, or political leaning. Further research would therefore benefit 
from examining the climate change threat perceptions of college students from countries with 
larger differences in GHG emissions levels, such as the United States and Denmark (MtCO2 = 
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Limitations & Future Research 
 Though the current study presented interesting findings on the relationship between 
cultural worldview and college students’ climate change threat perceptions, knowledge levels, 
and mitigation behaviors, it had a few limitations. First, both the scale used to measure 
respondents’ climate change knowledge and that used to assess individualism-communitarianism 
received poor inter-item reliability scores (α = 0.69 and α = 0.67, respectively) during 
preliminary analyses. In the case of the knowledge scale, this low alpha score may be due to the 
fact that only ten of the original thirty questions from Tobler et al.’s knowledge indexes were 
used.93 However, the individualism-communitarianism scale was identical to that used in 
previous studies, suggesting that the index may not be as applicable to college students as it is to 
other populations. Thus, the scales may not have reliably measured respondents’ climate change 
knowledge levels and degree of individualism. Future research would therefore benefit from 
testing these scales among larger samples of college students to see if stronger inter-item 
reliability scores can be obtained.  
  Second, the sample used in the present study disproportionately represented college 
students from the United States and India, precluding the possibility of comprehensively testing 
RQ4. This demographically skewed sample may also limit the generalizability of the study’s 
findings to college students from those predominantly represented regions. Additionally, the use 
of Amazon Mechanical Turk to recruit a proportion of respondents may further limit the 
generalizability and reliability of the present study’s findings. To gain a greater understanding of 
the relationship between the GHG emissions level of a college student’s home country and his or 
her climate change threat perception, future studies should survey a larger sample of students 
from a more diverse range of countries in terms of their emissions contributions. Additionally, 
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future research should examine the relationship between cultural worldview and climate change 
threat perception, knowledge levels, and mitigation behaviors among a larger and more diverse 
sample of college students to determine whether this study’s findings hold true in spite of this 
limitation.  
 Finally, while the present study found significant correlations between worldview and 
climate change threat perception, knowledge levels, and mitigation behaviors, the presence of 
intervening variables was not taken into account. It is therefore possible that these relationships 
are mediated by other variables, such as religion, gender, or political affiliation. It would 
accordingly be useful to reexamine the correlations found in the present study while controlling 
for other variables in future research.  
Conclusion 
 Taken together, the results of this study reveal that certain cultural worldviews are 
significantly associated with college students’ climate change threat perceptions, knowledge 
levels, and likelihood of engaging in mitigation behaviors. However, it remains unclear whether 
the GHG emissions level of a college student’s home country influences his or her climate 
change threat perception. Nonetheless, the present study contributes to the existing literature a 
greater understanding of the factors that influence college students’ climate change attitudes and 
behaviors. In order to achieve effective climate change communication and inspire action among 
college students, efforts must be made to tailor climate change campaigns and interventions to 
different cultural worldviews such that the conveyed information aligns with, rather than 
threatens, these cultural values. 
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